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Although the United States Supreme Court’s disposition of Bush
v. Gore (Bush II)1 ultimately turned on the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, an alternative theory, based on Article II of the United States Constitution, has garnered significant
academic support in the year following the decision.2 The Article II
theory was suggested in the initial per curiam opinion (Bush I)3 and
in the questions of the Justices during the oral arguments, and was
fully embraced by the concurrence in Bush II, which was written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas.
The reliance on Article II entailed a distinctive vision of the role of
state constitutions in the state governmental process and of the place
of federal courts in overseeing that role. The concurrence explicitly
adopted the view that the Constitution provided federal constraints
* Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law
School, 1990. I am grateful to Jim Rossi and the other organizers and participants in this
symposium. William W. Buzbee, Joseph P. Helm, Michael L. Wells, and Robert F. Williams
provided valuable advice and assistance.
1. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); Richard A. Epstein, “In such Manner as the
Legislature Thereof May Direct”: The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 613 (2001).
3. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam).
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on the authority of state courts to construe state procedures governing presidential elections.4 Under this conception, the concurrence
insisted on a central role for federal courts in policing the relationship between state courts and state legislatures.
The concurrence understood Article II both to grant plenary power
to state legislatures and to mandate federal oversight of a state
court’s interpretation of state law. Under this theory, the federal
courts not only review whether state law, as interpreted by state
courts, violates the Federal Constitution, but also review whether the
state court correctly interpreted state law. The concurrence justified
this extraordinary assertion of federal authority based on the need to
protect the state legislature from the state courts. The concurrence
further contended that uniformity in the construction of state election procedures was desirable and justified federalizing the interpretation of state law.
Underlying the concurrence’s interpretation of Article II was a
conception of the state constitutional system. The concurrence envisaged a unitary model of state constitutionalism that involved a
strong dichotomy between state constitutions and other forms of
state law. The concurrence apparently conceived of state constitutions and state statutes as relatively autonomous with little interpenetration. In the concurrence’s vision, state constitutions and state
statutes may be divided in a fairly straightforward manner without
any particular need to examine the context of a specific state’s constitutional system. The concurrence further assumed the predominance
of uniform principles of the allocation of interpretive authority at the
state level. At various points, the concurrence also evinced skepticism about the ability of state judges to reach fair and reasonable decisions and a corresponding confidence in the ability of federal courts
to discern appropriate benchmarks against which to measure state
judicial deviation.
This Article argues that the flawed nature of the concurrence’s
understanding of state constitutional systems fatally undermined its
conclusions. The concurrence’s homogenizing conception failed to
capture important features of state constitutions. An understanding
of the role of state constitutions in the state law process requires an
appreciation of the characteristics of a particular state’s constitution.
The attempt to fit all state constitutions into a particular mold will
necessarily fail, and the complexity of each state’s constitutional dynamic suggests that the United States Supreme Court should not attempt to create uniform rules of interpretation governing the role of
state constitutions in presidential election disputes. The principle of
separation of powers in state governments takes a variety of forms
4. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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and often differs substantially from the federal model. Without an
understanding of a particular state’s system, it is impossible to comprehend the appropriate relationship between state courts and state
legislatures. Moreover, the diversity of state statutory regimes belies
the concurrence’s apparent confidence in the existence of a single,
correct method of interpreting state statutes and its related assertion
that it, rather than the Florida Supreme Court, best understood the
Florida Election Code.
Part I reviews the concurrence’s theory that Article II of the Federal Constitution grants special, plenary authority to the state legislature. I argue that this interpretation did not rest on firm foundations of text, precedent, or history. Rather, the concurrence’s conception could be justified, if at all, only by resort to unarticulated federal
interests. Part II analyzes the concurrence’s related, but distinct conclusion that Article II mandates that federal courts independently
review the correctness of state courts’ constructions of state laws
governing presidential elections. As with the concurrence’s notion of
plenary legislative power, I argue that the concurrence’s scrutiny of
state courts’ interpretation of state law can be justified only by the
existence of extraordinary federal interests, which remain unexplored in the opinion. Part III turns directly to an account of the federal interests at stake. This Part examines potential interests, such
as the need to protect the state legislature from unprincipled judicial
activism, the need for uniformity in the interpretation of presidential
election codes, and the relative competence of the federal courts in
interpreting state election laws. I argue that a proper understanding
of state constitutional systems demonstrates the absence of any of
these potential justifications for federal judicial intervention in this
case. Part III further contends that the diversity of state constitutional contexts undermines the concurrence’s efforts to formulate
uniform interpretive rules for state election codes. Part IV concludes
with some more general reflections on the implications of the concurrence’s flawed conception of state constitutional law.
I. ARTICLE II AND STATE LAW
Article II provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,” electors for President and
Vice President.5 In Bush I, the United States Supreme Court suggested that this language did not merely specify that state law would
govern the conduct of presidential elections but in fact constituted a
special kind of delegation of authority to the state legislature.6 In

5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
6. The per curiam opinion stated:
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Bush II, the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas, explicitly adopted this position. The
concurrence asserted that Article II “leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the method” of selecting presidential electors and
that a “significant departure from the legislative scheme,” therefore,
raises a federal constitutional question.7 Indeed, from the remainder
of the opinion, it is clear that under the concurrence’s theory, a significant departure from the legislative scheme not only raises a constitutional question but actually violates the provisions of Article II.
Accordingly, the concurrence undertook the task of determining
whether the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida law
distorted the intent of the legislature, thus transgressing Article II.
This section examines some of the bases for the theory that Article
II confers plenary power on the state legislature. I explore in particular the justification for concluding that Article II frees the state legislature from the constraints that the state constitution otherwise
would impose. The state constitution assumes particular importance
in the discussion because, with the exception of the United States
Constitution, the state constitution generally serves as the sole check
on state legislative power. The primary target of a plenary power
reading of Article II is the state constitution. As became apparent in
Bush II, the concurrence’s theory targets the state judiciary as well.
In defending its understanding of Article II, the concurrence relied primarily on the text of the constitutional provision and on language drawn from McPherson v. Blacker.8 As the dissenters pointed
out, however, neither the word “legislature” nor the Blacker precedent can bear the weight that the concurrence places on it.9 A possible source for the interpretation of Article II on which the concur[I]n the case of a law enacted by a state legislature applicable not only to elections to state offices, but also to the selection of Presidential electors, the legislature is not acting solely under the authority given it by the people of the
State, but by virtue of a direct grant of authority made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2,
of the United States Constitution.
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76.
7. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892)).
8. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
9. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg
and Breyer, JJ.) (rejecting concurrence’s interpretation of Article II and Blacker); id. at
147-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined in relevant part by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter,
JJ.) (same); see also id. at 141-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer, JJ.) (rejecting concurrence’s interpretation of Article II, without specific reference
to Blacker); POSNER, supra note 2, at 156 (describing Article II theory as “not compelled by
case law, legislative history, or constitutional language”).
With regard to the Article II issue, Justice Souter’s dissent focused on defending the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision against the charge of being unreasonable. Justice Souter
did not confront directly the concurrence’s derivation of a special limitation on judicial interpretation of state laws governing presidential elections. See id. at 129-33 (Souter, J.,
dissenting, joined in relevant part by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.).
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rence did not rely was evidence of the Framers’ conception of the relationships between state legislatures and state constitutions. The
inferences from the founding period, however, are similarly unsupportive of the concurrence’s position.
A. Text and Context
The concurrence proceeded as if the constitutional language contained a clear, self-evident grant of plenary authority to the legislature. The text, however, is not nearly so univocal. Contrary to the
theory of the concurrence, the constitutional use of “legislature” certainly could refer to the lawmaking authority of the state generally.
Under this interpretation, the constitutional language indicates that
the determination of the method of selecting presidential electors
shall be governed by state law, as state law is commonly made in the
state. The constitutional language, in this view, does not endow the
state legislature with a special role. Instead, the state legislature
would act in this area of lawmaking as it does in all others, subject to
the constraints of the state constitution and to the interpretive authority of the state courts, insofar as the courts have jurisdiction under the relevant statutory and constitutional scheme. The United
States Supreme Court previously adopted such an interpretation of
similar language in Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. That provision states, “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof . . . .”10
In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant,11 the United States Supreme
Court addressed a claim that in light of Article 1, Section 4, a state
legislative reapportionment scheme could not be subject to a popular
referendum. The Court found that the challenge under Article 1,
Section 4 should be construed as raising a claim that the state referendum system destroyed the legislative power, thus violating the
guarantee of republican government contained in Article IV of the
United States Constitution.12 As thus construed, the Court held the
challenge to be nonjusticiable. Because the Court relied on nonjusticiability rather than a direct interpretation of Article I, Section 4,
Hildebrant may be of limited relevance. Nevertheless, a possible inference is that the Court concluded that the only way in which statelaw restrictions on legislative prerogative could raise constitutional
issues would be for the limitations actually to obliterate the exercise
of legislative power. The Court colorfully characterized the challenge
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
11. 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
12. “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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to the referendum procedure as resting “upon the assumption that to
include the referendum in the scope of the legislative power is to introduce a virus which destroys that power, which in effect annihilates representative government . . . .”13 Hildebrant thus could be understood to stand for the principle that, at least with respect to Article I, Section 4, state-law restrictions on legislative power are constitutionally acceptable as long as they do not infect the state with a virus that fatally undermines legislative power.
In a later case, Smiley v. Holm,14 the Court more directly confronted the interpretation of the grant of authority to the “legislature” in Article I, Section 4. Smiley raised the question whether this
language empowered a state legislature to establish congressional
districts free from the usual state-law requirement of presentment to
the Governor for signature or veto. In Smiley, the state supreme
court had accepted an argument, similar to that endorsed by concurrence in Bush II, that the constitutional reference to “legislature”
gave the state legislature special authority, different from the lawmaking power that it normally exercised.15 The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that Article I, Section 4
merely referred to the normal lawmaking processes of the state, including any limitations imposed by the state constitution.16
Stronger, albeit inferential, support for the plenary power position
comes from the analogy to the action of the state legislature in ratifying amendments to the United States Constitution. Under Article V,
one path to the ratification of an amendment is approval by “the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States . . . .”17 In two cases in
the 1920s, the United States Supreme Court suggested that in ratifying constitutional amendments, state legislatures did operate independently of certain provisions of state law.18
Hawke v. Smith19 concerned a provision of the Ohio Constitution
that apparently made legislative ratifications of amendments to the
United States Constitution subject to a popular referendum. In finding the referendum provision inapplicable, the United States Supreme Court gave an expansive account of the power of the state legislature. The Court asserted that in ratifying constitutional amend13. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 569.
14. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
15. Id. at 364-65.
16. Id. at 367-68 (“We find no suggestion in the Federal constitutional provision of an
attempt to endow the legislature of the State with power to enact laws in any manner
other than that in which the Constitution of the State has provided that laws shall be enacted.”).
17. U.S. CONST. art. V.
18. See generally Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Hawke v. Smith 253 U.S. 221
(1920).
19. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
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ments, the state legislature enjoyed special authority, independent of
its usual lawmaking competence. The Court noted the argument that
ratification constituted an act of lawmaking subject to state-law requirements. The Court rejected this position, asserting that “ratification by a State of a constitutional amendment is not an act of legislation within the proper sense of the word.”20 The Court further emphasized the federal nature of the ratification authority: “It is true
that the power to legislate in the enactment of the laws of a State is
derived from the people of the State. But the power to ratify a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution has its source in the
Federal Constitution.”21
In assessing this language, it is useful to keep in mind the extraordinary circumstances in which Hawke arose. After the Ohio
Legislature purportedly ratified the Eighteenth Amendment, establishing Prohibition, the Secretary of State of the United States
declared the amendment valid, listing Ohio as one of the ratifying
states.22 The Court expressed understandable concern at the prospect
that the validity of an amendment to the United States Constitution
could be undermined based on a state-law challenge brought after
national recognition of the ratification.23 In the context of constitutional amendments, the Court suggested, uniform procedures were
required to avoid confusion and disarray.24 The inhospitable context
in which the challenge arose may limit the broad applicability of the
language in the Article V context.25
The other case addressing the influence of state law in limiting
the state legislature’s ratification authority arose in a similarly unappealing context. Leser v. Garnett26 concerned challenges to the validity of the Nineteenth Amendment, granting suffrage to women,
based on alleged failures to comply with state-law mandates. In rebuffing these claims, the Court again affirmed that when exercising
its ratification authority, the state legislature acts unrestricted by
20. Id. at 229.
21. Id. at 230.
22. Id. at 225; see also Vikram David Amar, The People Made Me Do It: Can the People of the States Instruct and Coerce Their State Legislatures in the Article V Constitutional
Amendment Process?, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037, 1076-79 (2000) (describing circumstances surrounding Hawke v. Smith).
23. See Hawke, 253 U.S. at 230.
24. See id. (“Any other view might lead to endless confusion in the manner of ratification of federal amendments. The choice of means of ratification was wisely withheld from
conflicting action in the several States.”).
25. See Amar, supra note 22, at 1079-80 (suggesting that the distinctive factual context of Hawke limits its applicability as an interpretation of the scope of state-law limitations over Article V processes); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of The Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677,
731 (1993) (discussing the role of state law in regulating the state ratification process and
concluding that “Hawke was wrongly decided”).
26. 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
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state law limitations.27 The broad language mirrored the statements
in Hawke. As in Hawke, one can understand the reluctance of the
Court to entertain attempts to revoke a constitutional amendment
that had been certified by the Secretary of State of the United States.
For present purposes, the Court’s emphasis on the federal character
of the state legislative ratification remains most relevant: “But the
function of a state legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment to
the Federal Constitution, like the function of Congress in proposing
the amendment, is a federal function derived from the Federal Constitution; and it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by
the people of a State.”28 Also relevant is the Court’s apparent, though
unexpressed, concern about the chaos that such after-the-fact challenges could produce.
The ratification of constitutional amendments differs in many
ways from designating the manner of selecting presidential electors.
The latter involves the articulation of election procedures in a manner generally accomplished by legislative activity. Promulgating an
election code, for whatever office, is a kind of function normally undertaken by the body wielding the lawmaking authority of the state.
Approving or disapproving a proposed amendment to the United
States Constitution is arguably sui generis; setting election processes
is not. In this way, regulating presidential elections seems to bear a
much closer resemblance to regulating congressional elections than it
does to ratifying constitutional amendments.29
On the other hand, setting procedures for presidential elections
does share some attributes with the amendment process. In particular, the outcome of the process has national effects in a way that the
election of representatives and senators from a state does not. As
with the ratification of amendments, in a presidential election each
state is a participant in a process with a single national outcome. As
we are all now painfully aware, delay or confusion in the election
process in any one state puts the rest of the nation on hold. Clarity
and finality serve strong national interests with respect both to
amendments and to presidential elections. The analogy is not exact,
but similar concerns attend both processes.
Without much amplification, the concurrence in Bush II noted the
strong national interest in the conduct of presidential elections.
Rather than rely on Hawke or Leser, the concurrence quoted general
statements from other opinions about the important federal functions
performed by presidential electors and the national interest in presi27. See id. at 137.
28. Id.
29. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 n.1 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Article I, §
4, and Article II, § 1, both call upon legislatures to act in a lawmaking capacity whereas
Article V simply calls on the legislative body to deliberate upon a binary decision.”).
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dential elections.30 What remains unclear, however, is how the strong
federal interest in presidential elections generates the unusual view
of legislative authority and judicial interpretation that the concurrence proceeded to employ in the case. In brief, granting that the selection of presidential electors implicates significant national concerns, why would eschewing reliance on state constitutions serve
that interest?
B. The Blacker Precedent
The theory that Article II’s reference to the “Legislature” means
something other than the usual lawmaking authority of the state
does not ineluctably follow from the constitutional text. The main
case on which the concurrence relied, McPherson v. Blacker,31 similarly provides at best ambiguous support for the plenary power theory.
Blacker concerned the Michigan Legislature’s division of the state
into districts for presidential elections. By statute, the state legislature had provided that presidential electors would be elected in each
congressional district, rather than on a statewide basis.32 The statute
was challenged on the theory that statewide election was required by
Article II’s command that “[e]ach State shall appoint”33 presidential
electors. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court asserted
that the constitutional reference to a “State” designated the lawmaking authority of the state, a conclusion the Court found reinforced by the language “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct . . . .”34 The Court concluded that Article II could not be
read to limit the authority of the state legislature to allocate electors
by district, rather than by the state as a whole.35 The Court buttressed its conclusion by noting the long history of states selecting
presidential electors by districts.36
The opinion does contain language emphasizing the authority reposed in the state legislature. The opinion refers to the “plenary
power”37 of the state legislatures in the appointment of electors. The
concurrence emphasized Blacker’s statement that the United States
Constitution “leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the

30. See id. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Burroughs v. United States,
290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934), and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794-95 (1983)).
31. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
32. Id. at 24.
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
34. Id.
35. Blacker, 146 U.S. at 27, 35-36.
36. Id. at 29-33.
37. Id. at 35.
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method” of selecting presidential electors.38 As the context of this
particular quotation,39 as well as the opinion as a whole, indicates
though, all this language is focused on supporting the power of the
legislature to choose various methods of selecting electors. In
Blacker, no state-law impediment blocked the legislative choice, and
the language of the opinion certainly does not command the conclusion that state-law restrictions are rendered impermissible by Article
II.
The strongest support for the proposition that the state legislature
acts outside of the usual state-law framework appeared in a Senate
Report quoted in the opinion.40 With regard to the power of the state
legislature to choose presidential electors, that Report asserted, “This
power is conferred upon the legislatures of the States by the constitution of the United States, and cannot be taken from them or modified
by their State constitutions . . . .”41 The Senate Report recommended
a constitutional amendment providing that a state’s electoral votes
be determined by a direct vote of the people of each state, on a district-by-district basis.42 The Report stressed the residual power of the
state legislatures and thus emphasized that only a constitutional
amendment could guarantee direct popular participation in a presidential election.43 This language from a Senate Report supporting an
unadopted constitutional amendment adds little to the basic point
that Blacker used broad language endorsing state legislative power,
but deployed that language in responding to quite a different question from that posed in the Bush cases.
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, Blacker also contains isolated language that contradicted the concurrence’s theory.44
In certain passages, that opinion suggested that in determining the
38. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
39. The quoted language comes from the following paragraph:
The [United States] [C]onstitution does not provide that the appointment of
electors shall be by popular vote, nor that the electors shall be voted for upon a
general ticket, nor that the majority of those who exercise the elective franchise
can alone choose the electors. It recognizes that the people act through their
representatives in the legislature, and leaves it to the legislature exclusively to
define the method of effecting the object.
Blacker, 146 U.S. at 27. In this passage, the word “exclusively” appears to refer to the absence of federal constitutional limitations on the legislature’s choice, rather than the absence of any state law limitations. Indeed, the emphasis on the legislature’s representing
the people could be quite compatible with the notion that the legislature might need to
take cognizance of the will of the people as expressed in the state constitution.
40. Id. at 34-35 (citing S. REP. NO. 43-395 (1874)).
41. Id. at 35 (quoting S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 9).
42. S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 2.
43. The Report proved quite prescient in certain regards. It expressed concern that a
President might be elected by receiving a majority of the electoral votes while “his opponent may carry the remaining States by such majorities as to give him perhaps half a million majority of the whole vote of the people.” Id. at 5.
44. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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manner of appointing presidential electors, as in other legislative actions, the state legislature must conform to the usual restrictions on
legislative power, including any limitations imposed by the state constitution.45 The dissenters also might have noted that in its lengthy
description of the various methods by which states had chosen electors in previous presidential elections, Blacker mentioned that the
manner of selection in Colorado actually was set by the state constitution.46 None of Justice Stevens’ references definitively refute the
concurrence’s theory of plenary legislative power under Article II.
The references merely confirm that Blacker offers at best limited
support for the concurrence’s thesis.
C. The Framers’ View of State Constitutions and State Legislatures
The evidence from the founding period does not appear sympathetic to a conception of plenary legislative power. Rather, the Framers harbored a certain degree of distrust of state legislatures.47 The
Framers of the United States Constitution were aware of the different forms of government attempted under state constitutions, and
they understood the problem of legislative overreaching that could
occur under the then-existing state charters.48 Indeed, scholars such
as Robert Williams have suggested that the unchecked legislative
power embodied in such documents as the Pennsylvania Constitution
of 1776 provided a kind of negative exemplar for those drafting the
United States Constitution.49 Such sources imply that the Framers
understood how state governments and state constitutions operated
and that they had concerns about the constitutional notion of un45. Justice Stevens characterized Blacker as follows:
Lest there be any doubt, we stated over 100 years ago in McPherson v. Blacker,
146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892), that “[w]hat is forbidden or required to be done by a
State” in the Article II context “is forbidden or required of the legislative power
under state constitutions as they exist.” In the same vein, we also observed that
“[t]he [State’s ] legislative power is the supreme authority except as limited by
the constitution of the State.”
Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Blacker, 146 U.S. at 33. Other states also regulate presidential elections in part
through state constitutional provisions. See OKLA. CONST. art. 3, § 3 (regulating nomination of presidential electors); PA. CONST. art. 7, § 13 (mandating judicial resolution of disputed presidential elections). But see State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh, 34 N.W.2d 279, 286-87
(Neb. 1948) (interpreting Blacker to prohibit a state constitutional provision from circumscribing the legislature’s prerogative).
47. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at
438-53 (1969); Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania’s Radical 1776 Constitution and Its Influences on American Constitutionalism, 62
TEMP. L. REV. 541 (1989).
48. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, “Experience Must Be Our Only Guide”: The State
Constitutional Experience of the Framers of the Federal Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 403, 424-27 (1988).
49. Id.; Williams, supra note 47, at 576, 584-85; see also WOOD, supra note 47, at 43853.
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checked state legislative power. Of course, before the Reconstruction
Amendments and the doctrine of incorporation, the state constitution
served as the primary limitation on state legislative power and the
primary protector of individual rights. The United States Constitution in this period offered only quite modest constraints on state legislative power.50 Again, the sources are not conclusive but do not appear to lend support to the view of the concurrence. These observations from the founding are certainly consistent with the notion that
Article II confers power on the state legislature as situated within an
ongoing constitutional system, as opposed to the idea that Article II
lifts the state legislature out of the usual state governmental framework.
II. SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF STATE COURT DETERMINATIONS
OF STATE LAW
The concurrence’s theory of plenary legislative authority under
Article II, I have argued, does not rest on firm foundations of text,
precedent, or history. The truly remarkable feature of the concurrence, however, lies in its assertion of a strong federal role in reviewing state court determinations of state law.51 Warned by the United
States Supreme Court’s remand in Bush I, the Florida Supreme
Court disavowed reliance on the state constitution in its subsequent
rulings. In Bush II, the concurrence clarified that in the view of the
Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas, the plenary power
theory served not only to disable the state constitution, but also to
impose a federal anti-distortion rule on the state judiciary.52
The concurrence acknowledged that in reviewing cases arising out
of state courts, the United States Supreme Court generally accepts
as authoritative state court determinations of state law.53 In this instance, however, the concurrence drove a federal wedge between
50. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
51. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112-15 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
52. Id. at 111-22. The Florida Supreme Court apparently understood the Article II issue as a rather formalistic prohibition on relying on the state constitution. Accordingly, on
remand in Bush I, the Florida Supreme Court largely reiterated its first opinion, deleting
the references to the state constitution. See Gore v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2000).
The Florida Supreme Court seems to have understood the situation as presenting a kind of
harmless error calculation. A common occurrence, particularly in criminal cases, is for the
United States Supreme Court to suggest that a state court relied on an invalid basis for a
judgment. It is typical for the state supreme court then to undertake a harmless error
analysis, which may well result in the court’s reissuing the same judgment. At least certain Justices on the United States Supreme Court apparently contemplated that they were
dispensing a more thoroughgoing rebuke to the Florida Supreme Court and that its reissuing the prior judgment indicated insubordination. See Oral Argument at 44, Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/florida.html;
Linda Greenhouse, Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2001, at A1.
53. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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state law as promulgated by the legislature and state law as interpreted by the state courts. Article II, the concurrence asserted, conferred independent significance on the former and imposed a corresponding duty on the United States Supreme Court to ensure that
the state court interpretation did not distort the legislative command.54
A. The Concurrence’s Standard of Review: “Independent”
and/or “Deferential”
In discussing its review of the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment,
the concurrence referred to the United States Supreme Court’s constitutional duty “to undertake an independent, if still deferential,
analysis of state law.”55 An initial problem in understanding this
formulation is that it appears to contemplate review that is both “independent” and “deferential.” This standard has an oxymoronic quality in that independent review generally is contrasted with deferential review.56
In any event, the concurrence’s analysis of the opinions of the
Florida Supreme Court could hardly be termed deferential. Having
avowed a deferential standard, the concurrence deployed the necessary adjectival barrage. The concurrence labeled the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Florida election scheme “absurd”57 and “peculiar”58 and asserted that “[n]o reasonable person”59
could share that court’s understanding of the law. The dissenters objected that the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida law
was reasonable.60 The arguments of the dissenters, as well as of subsequent academic commentators,61 cast substantial doubt on the concurrence’s characterization of the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida law. Indeed, the concurrence appeared to engage in
de novo review of the state court’s interpretation of the state statutory scheme. Based on the answer the concurrence provided, the
proper question was not whether the Florida Supreme Court departed substantially from the legislative plan but simply whether
that court correctly construed the statutes. Such judgments are of
54. Id. at 112-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
55. Id. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
56. See, e.g., Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991) (“[T]he difference
between a rule of deference and the duty to exercise independent review is ‘much more
than a mere matter of degree.’” (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 501 (1984))).
57. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., id. at 151-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
61. See, e.g., James M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1416-25 (2001).
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course contestable, but the concurrence’s approach did not appear
deferential.62 For present purposes, though, the critical question is
not whether the concurrence or the Florida Supreme Court better
understood Florida law or even the precise standard of review that
the concurrence adopted. Rather, the key issue is the justification for
federal scrutiny of the state court’s interpretation of state law. Consideration of other contexts in which the United States Supreme
Court has exercised review of state-law issues helps to provide a
framework for assessing the concurrence’s approach.
B. Precedents for Federal Review of State Court Determinations
of State Law
In a variety of areas, the United States Supreme Court has asserted the authority to review state court determinations of state
law. Though diverse in terms of subject matter and approach, these
cases generally involve a strong federal interest in the predictable
application of state law and a suspicion about whether the state
courts will adequately protect the federal interest. One could characterize the cases as involving a presumed federal interest in predictability and a presumed comparative institutional advantage of the
federal courts in interpreting the applicable law. Invocations of due
process limitations on retroactivity, general common law, and federal
common law reflect these principles.63

62. Of course, “deference” may be a relative term, and the approach of the concurrence may have some affinities with the scope of review that the Court has adopted in
some recent cases testing the breadth of congressional authority. See Robert A. Schapiro,
Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 669-80 (2000). In embarking on its current course of reviewing
congressional power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments, for example, the Court
avowed “deference” to congressional judgments. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
536 (1997) (“It is for Congress in the first instance to ‘determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ and its conclusions are entitled to much deference.” (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651
(1966))). Especially as elaborated in subsequent cases, however, the Court’s mode of review
appears rather skeptical. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Trs. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). To put it slightly differently, if deference is defined by Kimel
and Garrett, the approach of the concurrence in Bush II may appear relatively more deferential. Cf. id. at 386-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s more recent cases have professed to follow the longstanding principle of deference to Congress. . . . But the Court’s
analysis and ultimate conclusion deprive its declarations of practical significance. The
Court ‘sounds the word of promise to the ear but breaks it to the hope.’”).
63. Protective jurisdiction also often reflects an interest in the uniform development
of the law and a skepticism about the capacity of state courts to sustain this federal interest. See Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30
UCLA L. REV. 542, 566-76 (1983).
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1. Bouie and Fair Notice
The principal precedents cited by the concurrence were Bouie v.
City of Columbia64 and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.65 In
these cases, the United States Supreme Court concluded that state
courts had engaged in novel acts of interpretation that deprived individuals of valuable rights without fair notice. In Bouie, the South
Carolina Supreme Court had adopted a new construction of a criminal trespass statute to affirm the convictions of demonstrators protesting a racially segregated lunch counter.66 The NAACP case concerned a contempt citation against the NAACP for refusing to divulge its membership lists. The United States Supreme Court refused to allow the state court=s invocation of a novel procedural rule
to thwart federal review of the underlying constitutional issue.67 In
both cases, the federal interest in the predictable applications of
state law was clear and was embodied in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the civil rights context in
which the cases arose evoked some suspicion of the state courts. In
her dissent in Bush II, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the civil rights
background to the cases,68 and commentators have stressed this aspect as well.69 As I will suggest, presidential elections do implicate
important federal interests, but whether that federal interest requires a federal standard of predictability is far from certain.
2. General Common Law
In some measure, the concurrence’s review of state court determinations of state law hearkens back to United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence in the pre-Erie era. During this period the federal
courts generally deferred to state court constructions of state statutes and state constitutions, even while they disavowed reliance on
state court precedent in matters of general common law. However,
federal courts sometimes did engage in independent interpretation of
state statutes and constitutions.70 In Township of Pine Grove v. Tal64. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
65. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
66. 378 U.S. at 348, 355-56.
67. 357 U.S. at 454-58.
68. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 139-41 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
69. See Harold J. Krent, Should Bouie Be Buoyed?: Judicial Retroactive Lawmaking
and the Ex Post Facto Clause, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 35, 54-56 (1997); see also id. at
55 n.82 (citing sources). Professor Krent has suggested that while Bouie has been applied
outside of the civil rights context, its application often has been associated with “limiting
judicial vindictiveness.” Id. at 74.
70. See Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1281-82 (2000); James A. Gardner, The Positivist Revolution That Wasn’t: Constitutional Universalism in the States, 4
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 109, 117-22 (1998).
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cott,71 for example, the United States Supreme Court confronted the
question whether a state statute violated the state constitution. The
Michigan Supreme Court had adjudicated this question on two occasions.72 The United States Supreme Court, though, refused to follow
those opinions.73 The Court reviewed and rejected the state court’s
interpretation of the Michigan Constitution.74 The United States Supreme Court stated: “With all respect for the eminent tribunal by
which the judgments were pronounced, we must be permitted to say
that they are not satisfactory to our minds. We think the dissenting
opinion in the one first decided is unanswered.”75 In this period, the
United States Supreme Court appeared especially willing to reject
state court interpretations that departed from prior state decisional
authority so as to frustrate commercial expectations. For example, in
suits by bondholders, the Court did not feel bound to follow novel
state court rulings that the bonds were issued without proper legal
authority and were therefore uncollectible.76 The Court’s decisions reflected a strong federal interest in a uniform, predictable law governing commercial activity. Further, the Court’s decisions evinced a
skepticism about the fairness of state court decisions, particularly as
they related to the rights of out-of-state creditors. Such skepticism
may have been warranted.77 As the Court memorably summed up its
attitude toward state court interpretations of state law, “We shall
never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a State tribunal
has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice.”78 Even in this period,
the United States Supreme Court exercised interpretive autonomy
only if an independent basis of federal jurisdiction, such as diversity,
existed. The Court did not view such flawed state court rulings as
creating a federal question permitting direct review by the United
States Supreme Court.79 Rather, it was the constitutional and statutory grants of diversity jurisdiction that provided a legal basis for
skepticism about state court interpretation of state law.
3. A Federal Common Law of Election Procedure
Perhaps the better framework for understanding Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s approach is federal common law, the modern successor
that arose out of the ashes of general common law. In effect, the concurrence treated the Florida code governing presidential elections as
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 666 (1874).
Id. at 677.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Collins, supra note 70, at 1269-72.
See id.
Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 206-07 (1863).
See Collins, supra note 70, at 1271-72.
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a species of federal law, subject to plenary review in the United
States Supreme Court. The relevant precedent was not the line of
cases including Murdock v. City of Memphis80 and Michigan v.
Long,81 establishing that the United States Supreme Court would
generally not review state court resolutions of state law issues. Nor,
despite the claims of the concurrence, did the opinion draw its support from Bouie and its progeny, establishing that in narrow circumstances novel state court interpretations of state law would impose
unconstitutional burdens on litigants without fair notice. The manner of interpretation undertaken by the concurrence suggested that
the controlling authority was Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,82 which affirmed the Supreme Court’s authority to review state court interpretations of federal law.
As the concurrence did not fully explain its independent standard
of review, it did not address the implicit transmutation of state law
into federal law. In light of the concurrence’s emphasis on the important federal interests involved, it appears that the concurrence essentially decided that Article II authorized a federal common law
governing presidential election procedures. In accord with Article II’s
command, the state legislature determined the content of the election
code, but the interpretation of the code presented a federal question.
As with the other areas discussed, the creation of federal common
law is generally justified by the strength of the federal interest and
the need for predictability and uniformity.83 Skepticism of allowing
the conduct to be regulated wholly by state law as defined by state
courts also characterizes federal common law.84
III. THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN STATE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
PROCEDURES
So far, I have argued that both the concurrence’s conception of legislative power under Article II and its approach to reviewing the
80. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
81. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
82. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
83. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 982-83 (1986); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal
Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1170 (1986); see also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979).
84. Thus, when federal common law incorporates state law, courts generally recognize
a reserved federal right to disregard state law that would disserve the particular federal
interest at issue. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001)
(“This federal reference to state law will not obtain, of course, in situations in which the
state law is incompatible with federal interests.”); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570,
581 (1956) (in context of Copyright Act, concluding that “[t]his does not mean that a State
would be entitled to use the word ‘children’ in a way entirely strange to those familiar with
its ordinary usage, but at least to the extent that there are permissible variations in the
ordinary concept of ‘children’ we deem state law controlling.”).
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Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law depended on unarticulated notions of federal policy. Part I contended that the concurrence’s theory of plenary legislative power under Article II lacked
support in text, precedent, or history. The strongest basis for the concurrence’s understanding of legislative authority was the nature of
the federal interest in presidential elections. Part II argued that the
concurrence’s scrutiny of the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation
of state law is best explained as an attempt to fashion a federal
common law of presidential election procedures. However, whether
understood as federal common law, general common law, or the application of Bouie, the justification for the concurrence’s scrutiny of
state law requires an articulation of the nature of the federal interest
in the conduct of presidential elections in each state.85 The concurrence did little to explicate the nature of the federal interests that it
understood to ground its disposition of Bush II. This Part explores
the potential federal interests at stake, including protecting state
legislatures from judicial overreaching, ensuring uniformity in presidential election procedures, and imposing preferred modes of statutory construction. I argue that a proper understanding of state constitutions and the relationship between state courts and state legislatures demonstrates that no federal interests justify the kind of intrusive federal intervention advocated by the concurrence. Moreover,
the complexity of each state’s constitutional dynamic belies the concurrence’s attempt to mandate uniform rules for the interpretation of
state election statutes.
A. Federal Protection of State Legislatures
In its rejection of a role for state constitutions in setting presidential election procedures, as well as in its formulation of an antidistortion rule, the concurrence expressed a need to protect state legislatures from activist state courts. The concurrence assumed that
the will of the legislature would be thwarted by the limitations of the
state constitution and by the interference of the state courts. Rather
than conceiving of the state legislature as one part of functioning
state constitutional system, the concurrence insisted on extracting
the state legislature from its constitutional setting. The concurrence
refused to understand the state legislature as integrally connected to
a complex governmental structure that included a state constitution
and state courts. The concurrence contended that constitutional text
and precedent erected a judicially enforceable federal shield around
85. This Part focuses on the federal interests that might underlie the creation of federal common law. A similar analysis would apply to the invocation of Bouie or general
common law. Federal court review of state law in those areas, as well, rests on federal interests in the uniform application of law and assumptions about the relative competence of
federal and state courts.
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the state legislature. As discussed above, these claims are unconvincing. Moreover, the concurrence’s more general assertion of the need
to protect the state legislature manifested a lack of appreciation of
the functioning of state political systems. A more complete account of
the relationship among state courts, state constitutions, and state
legislatures indicates the absence of any need for federal intervention. Contrary to the view of the concurrence, the relationship among
state courts, state legislatures, and state constitutions can be conceived of as cooperative, rather than adversarial.
1. State Constitutions and State Legislatures
The concurrence did not devote much attention to supporting the
proposition that Article II’s reference to the legislature disabled the
state constitution. The concurrence appeared to assume a strong separation between the state legislature and the state constitution, and between state statutes and state constitutional law. Perhaps the concurrence, or the Court generally, understood the structure of the national
government in such dichotomous terms, but state constitutional systems generally have much less dualist tendencies. State constitutions
function more like statutes than does the Federal Constitution, and
the state legislature has a much greater role in the amendment and
interpretation of the constitution than Congress normally enjoys.
Other features of state constitutions support the principle that
state legislatures are well integrated into state constitutional law
processes. State constitutions function in a variety of ways. They allocate governmental authority. They place limits, both negative and
positive,86 on state governmental activity. They state broad principles
of democratic governance. They regulate apparently trivial aspects of
state law.87 State legislatures play an active role in the their promulgation and (frequent) amendment.88 The length, specificity, and easy
amendability of state constitutions helps to highlight the substantial
degree of integration between state constitutions and other forms of
state law. In Florida, for example, it is the state constitution that
86. For a discussion of state constitutions as affording positive rights, mandating governmental action, see Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of
Positive Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24
RUTGERS L.J. 1057 (1993); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The
Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999); Helen Hershkoff,
Welfare Devolution and State Constitutions, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1403 (1999); Schapiro,
supra note 62, at 709-10.
87. For some classic examples, see N.Y. CONST. art. 14, § 1 (regulating width of ski
slopes), and TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 16 (providing for banks’ use of “unmanned teller machines”); see also James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH. L. REV. 761, 818-19 (1992) (collecting examples of state constitutional provisions).
88. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 23-27 (1998); see also
Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV.
389, 428-30 & n.148 (1998) (citing sources).
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provides a comprehensive plan for judicial organization and jurisdiction.89 The interconnected nature of the statutory and constitutional
systems appears as well in the separation of powers principle embodied in the Florida Code, which makes explicit reference to the state
constitution:
The State Constitution contemplates the separation of powers
within state government among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government. . . . The judicial branch has the
purpose of determining the constitutional propriety of the policies
and programs and of adjudicating any conflicts arising from the interpretation or application of the laws.90

Other statutory provisions purport to define the meaning of terms
contained in the constitution, and state courts often defer to these
legislative judgments.91
2. State Courts and State Legislatures
Indeed, another key feature that distinguishes state constitutionalism from federal constitutionalism is the greater deference to the
legislature that state courts generally manifest. Perhaps because
their handiwork is more easily revised or because they are often subject to direct electoral review, state court judges generally avow a
very deferential standard of review in assessing the constitutionality
of legislative judgments.92 This high standard of invalidity corresponds to a background notion of one sense of plenary legislative
power. Under state constitutional schemes, state legislatures are
generally presumed to exercise all powers, unless the constitution
imposes limitations. Unlike the national legislature, the state legislature is not limited to enumerated powers. This plenary power theory may incline state courts to adopt a lesser role in constitutional
review.93
If citizens or legislators believe that state courts are invoking
their power unwisely, various remedies are available. States have
shown a fair amount of creativity in limiting the exercise of judicial
review under the state constitution. The constitutions of Nebraska
89. See FLA. CONST. art. V.
90. FLA. STAT. § 20.02(1) (2000).
91. See, e.g., Greater Loretta Improvement Ass’n v. Boone, 234 So. 2d 665, 670 (Fla.
1970) (“In Jasper v. Mease Manor, Inc. (Fla. 1968), 208 So. 2d 821, this Court sustained a
statute defining the word ‘charitable’ as used in the Florida Constitution even though such
definition conflicted with earlier decisions by this Court.”); see also ROBERT F. WILLIAMS,
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 642-47 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing legislative interpretation of the state constitution); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional
Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 200-01 (1983) (same).
92. Schapiro, supra note 62, at 690-95.
93. See id. at 693-95 (discussing connection between plenary power of state legislature and deferential standard of judicial review).
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and North Dakota, for example, require a supermajority vote of their
state supreme courts to declare a law unconstitutional.94 My point is
not that state courts never manifest activist tendencies; rather, the
point is that state political systems have evolved mechanisms for addressing the appropriate interaction of the state legislature and state
courts. In accordance with varying legal regimes, the relationship between state legislatures and state courts varies among states and
does not conform to the federal model.
Through the mediating force of the state judiciary, state legislatures tend to have a close and interactive relationship with state constitutions. Not only does the position of the state legislature differ
from that of Congress, but state legislatures may occupy different
roles in each state. Different amendment procedures, among other
features of state constitutions, produce different constitutional contexts in each state. I do not mean to take this argument of contextual
constitutionalism too far. Federal constitutional requirements95 and a
relatively common political culture may ensure that state constitutional systems do not diverge radically. Yet within the bounds of cultural and legal constraints, diversity may be quite significant. Again,
while not conclusive for interpreting Article II, the diversity of legislative roles in state constitutional systems suggests the conceptual
difficulty in attempting to detach the legislatures from their state
constitutional moorings.
B. Diversity in State Presidential Election Procedures
A need for uniformity generally serves as an important prerequisite for the creation of federal common law.96 The concurrence, however, provided no convincing account of the need for uniformity in
state presidential election procedures. Undoubtedly, the process of
choosing presidential electors implicates important federal interests.
The federal interests, however, do not justify the concurrence’s federalization of the interpretation of state election codes. As with the issue of protecting state legislatures, an understanding of the state po94. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (requiring concurrence of four
justices to hold legislation unconstitutional); id. art. VI, § 2 (setting membership of supreme court at five justices). For examples of applications of these provisions, see Spire v.
Beermann, 455 N.W.2d 749 (Neb. 1990) (upholding legislation despite four of seven justices finding it unconstitutional); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247
(N.D. 1994) (upholding state’s school finance system despite vote of three of five justices
that system violates state constitution). The Ohio Constitution previously contained a supermajority requirement, but this provision was repealed in 1944. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2
editor’s comment (West 1999). For further discussion of these supermajority requirements,
see Schapiro, supra note 62, at 691 n.220 (citing sources).
95. For a discussion of the federal constitutional constraints on the allocation of state
governmental authority, see Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State
Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51 (1998).
96. See Field, supra note 83, at 953; Meltzer, supra note 83, at 1170-71.
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litical system suggests the theoretical and practical problems with
attempting to mandate uniform principles of interpretation in the
election context.
The Article V precedents, Hawke v. Smith97 and Leser v. Garnett,98
provide some support for applying federal common law to state election procedures.99 As in the case of constitutional amendments, substantial federal interests turn on the outcome of a state’s selection of
presidential electors. Confusion and delay could be extremely detrimental to national concerns. However, the strength of the federal interest in predictability and uniformity is questionable. Certainly, the
integrity of the election process is critical, but the concern of frustrating legitimate expectations appears absent. It is not clear that anyone relied on any particular interpretation of the election code; nor is
it certain that this area is one in which a uniform baseline exists to
help ensure predictability. Election codes and their interpretation do
vary widely and unavoidably from state to state. State courts would
seem to be in the best position to interpret the particular election
codes in their states.
The Court’s attempt to impose centralized control over the interpretation of states’ presidential election codes thus appears misguided. Congress adopted a particular set of procedures, which contemplated states’ employing various methods in resolving contested
elections.100 Thus, neither Article II nor its congressional implementation suggests a need for interstate uniformity, much less a uniformity imposed by the United States Supreme Court. The congressionally established procedures entailed electoral determinations in
each state with Congress resolving any lingering disputes.101 By exercising independent review of state court determinations, effectively
federalizing state election codes, the United States Supreme Court
would be offering assistance that Congress did not seek.102 Nor did
the election cases present a scenario, like Hawke or Leser, in which
state court action threatened to undermine the finality of a national
decision. The electors had not voted, nor had Congress received their
votes.
97. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
98. 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
99. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 25, at 743 n.224 (arguing that the effect of a state’s application to Congress for a constitutional convention should be governed by federal law).
100. See, e.g., 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
101. 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-18 (1994).
102. Perhaps the concurrence’s view could rest on a notion that in the course of resolving election disputes, Congress may have to analyze the state election codes. By offering its
own interpretation of the election codes, the United States Supreme Court would thereby
be assisting Congress, utilizing its greater institutional competence in interpreting law.
Again, given the statutory scheme, the Court would be affording “unsought” and apparently undesired assistance. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam) (characterizing Court as discharging “unsought responsibility”).
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What does tie the concurrence to the Bouie line of cases, general
common law, and federal common law is a skepticism about the ability of state courts to protect the federal interest. Whether characterized as an interest in protecting state legislatures, who are acting as
federal agents, or as an interest in predictable resolution of election
controversies, the concurrence clearly believed that reliance on state
courts would jeopardize that interest. From the tenor of the opinion
and overall flow of the proceedings, the concurrence seemed to view
the activities of the Florida Supreme Court as proof that state courts
cannot be trusted in this area.103 Other than disagreement with the
Florida Supreme Court’s opinions in this case, however, the concurrence provided no explanation of why state courts are particularly
untrustworthy in interpreting presidential election codes. Moreover,
skepticism about state courts, in the absence of any special need for
uniformity, provides a very weak justification for federalizing the interpretation of state law.
C. Legislative Intent and the State Constitution
Even if the concurrence were justified in federalizing the interpretation of state election laws, a serious question would remain about
the particular interpretive methodology employed. Assuming that
federal interests in uniformity did demand that the interpretation of
state election codes be freed from the usual state law constraints, the
concurrence still would have to justify adopting a particular manner
of statutory construction different from that employed by the state
court. All parties agreed that even if the state legislature possessed
plenary authority, it could delegate that power.104 In this instance,
the legislature had set up a statutory scheme for resolving election
contests that contemplated judicial involvement. The key question
with regard to the state constitution, then, was not the abstract matter of whether the state legislature could have acted without regard
for constitutional constraints. The practical issue was whether the
state legislature intended to free itself of any constitutional limitations. The concurrence raised the intent of the legislature to supreme
importance, but the question remained how that intent should be
understood with regard to the state constitution. Here, again, the
103. In this regard, the best explanation for the concurrence’s position is that applied
by Justice Stevens to the majority’s decision to intervene in the recount. See Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (in context of recount procedures, noting the majority’s endorsement of the petitioners’ “lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity”
of the state judiciary).
104. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 28-31, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00949), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/florida.html/ (addressing scope of legislature’s grant of authority to the Florida courts); Brief for Respondent Albert Gore, Jr. at
13-14, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), available at http://www.
supremecourtus.gov/florida.html/ (same).
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concurrence’s vision of state constitutionalism asserted itself and led
the concurrence to reject the notion that the legislature desired to resort to constitutional principles.
A significant portion of the oral argument in Bush I revolved
around whether the references to the Florida Constitution in the
state court’s opinion reflected a necessary reliance on that charter, or
merely an invocation of an additional, aspirational set of values.105
The Justices mooted whether the state constitution had become a
substitute for the legislative text or whether it functioned like Blackstone, simply providing a nonbinding statement of principles.106
Justice Scalia, most notably, pressed the notion that the Florida
Supreme Court had used the state constitution to trump the legislature. Certainly, Justice Scalia asserted, the legislature could not
have welcomed the court’s use of the state constitution. In a series of
challenges to Laurence Tribe, who represented Vice President Gore,
Justice Scalia probed this point:
Question: Professor Tribe, can I ask you why you think the Florida legislature delegated to the Florida Supreme Court the authority to interpose the Florida Constitution? I mean, I—maybe your
experience with the legislative branch is different from mine, but
in my experience they are resigned to the intervention of the
courts, but have certainly never invited it . . . .
Question: They are resigned, that they are resigned to, but they
need not be resigned to the Florida Supreme Court interposing itself with respect to Federal elections, they need not be because the
Florida Constitution cannot affect it. And I—I just find it implausible that they really invited the Florida Supreme Court to interpose the Florida Constitution between what they enacted by statute and the ultimate result of the election.107

It is hazardous to ascribe views to Justices based on their questions.
However, Justice Scalia certainly suggested that the state constitution would operate only as an unwanted intruder in the interpretive
process.
Justice Scalia appeared ready to accept the notion that the state
constitution might present general aspirational principles, but he
firmly denied the notion that the state legislature would want to bind
itself to the state constitution, as interpreted by the state court.
Based on the general features of state constitutions discussed above,
I would like to explore two responses to this view. First, it is not clear
why a state legislature would necessarily wish to exclude state constitutional limitations from the consideration of the judiciary. Sec105. See Oral Argument at 56-61, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531
U.S. 70 (2000) (No. 00-836), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/florida.html.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 66-67.
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ond, it is not clear that a uniform characterization of state constitutions is possible. State constitutions vary a great deal. Without a
comprehensive assessment of a particular state’s constitutional system, an appreciation of the relationship among the constitution, the
legislature, and the courts will remain elusive.
1. Determining Legislative Intent
On two levels, a court’s attention to the state constitution may
promote, rather than deform, the statutory scheme. First, the state
constitution may announce general principles that inform legislative,
as well as judicial, decisions. Second, when the legislature enlists judicial aid in resolving election disputes, it is a fair inference that the
legislature expects the court to decide cases in the way in which the
court generally decides cases.
The state constitution may contain an accurate rendition of the
goals and fears of the state legislature. In this way, the state constitution may function as a well-publicized, formally adopted legislative
finding. Of particular use in close or ambiguous cases, the state constitution may reveal the general purposes of the legislative enactment. The Florida Supreme Court’s invocation of the state constitution in its opinion in Bush I was consistent with this view of the state
constitution as an interpretive guide, rather than a self-aggrandizing
judicial sword. That opinion certainly allowed the view of the constitution as a guide to, rather than a substitute for, statutory meaning.
At several points, the Florida Supreme Court emphasized that the
Florida Constitution establishes the right of suffrage. The court
stressed that the very first words of the Florida Constitution declare
that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people,”108 and the court
characterized the right of suffrage as “preeminent.”109 For the most
part, the court appeared to use the fundamentality of the right to
vote as an aid to statutory construction, as a means of making sense
of a conflicting statutory regime. The court did imply that facilitating
the right to vote was not only the presumed intent of the legislature
but also a mandate limiting the discretion of the legislature: “To the
extent that the Legislature may enact laws regulating the electoral
process, those laws are valid only if they impose no ‘unreasonable or
unnecessary’ restraints on the right of suffrage . . . .”110 The court,
however, followed this assertion with a resort to a rule of construction, stating that “[b]ecause election laws are intended to facilitate

108. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1236 (Fla. 2000)
(quoting FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated sub nom.
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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the right of suffrage, such laws must be liberally construed in favor
of the citizens’ right to vote . . . .”111 The court also suggested that the
interpretive principles flowing from the state constitutional right to
vote pointed away from a strict textual approach. The court warned
that “[t]echnical statutory requirements must not be exalted over the
substance”112 of the right to vote and disavowed a “hyper-technical reliance upon statutory provisions . . . .”113
Do these passages mean that the court was substituting the constitutional right for the statutory text or, alternatively, that the court
had given proper effect to legislative intent through appropriately intentionalist interpretation? Particularly because of the close interconnection of statutory and constitutional law, such questions have
no clear answers. Would the legislature have wanted the court to enforce the letter of the statute if it conflicted with more basic democratic principles? Did the legislature believe that the letter of the law
properly embodied its democratic commitments?
One response to these interpretive ambiguities would be a strict
reliance on the text of the election code. A committed textualist
might argue that the language of the statute should be taken as conclusive evidence of the goal of the legislative scheme. Any reliance on
the state constitution to vary the text would thus be illegitimate. The
concurrence did stress the significance of the statutory text. The concurrence asserted that because of Article II’s direct conferral of authority on the state legislature, “the text of the election law itself,
and not just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on
independent significance.”114 Perhaps in this view, the state courts
must adopt a textualist approach to statutory interpretation.115 The
United States Supreme Court would then defer to the state court as
to which of competing textualist arguments deserved credence. The
United States Supreme Court, though, would not be bound to defer to
nontextual conclusions of the state courts. Such a preference for textualism would coincide with the concurrence’s skepticism of the state
judiciary, for one of the justifications for a textual approach lies in its
purported ability to restrain unprincipled judicial activism.116
If the supposed plenary authority of the legislature were to yield
some preferred method of statutory construction, however, it is not
clear that textualism would be the leading candidate. After all, tex111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1237.
Id.
Id. at 1227.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 63 (4th ed. Supp. 2001) (noting possibility that concurrence
suggests an Article II directive to employ textualism).
116. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 229 (2000).
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tualism often is contrasted with other methods of interpretation that
attempt more directly to ascertain the intent of the legislature.117
Application of a textualist approach might entail contravening the
intent of the enacting body in a specific instance.118 Textualism draws
support instead from rule-of-law and separation of powers principles.119 Indeed, textualism sometimes functions as part of a strategy
to discipline the legislature to induce it to act more responsibly.120
Whatever the merits of a judge’s exercising disciplinary control over
the legislature, such a judicial role stands in substantial tension with
a hypothesis of plenary legislative power.121
In addition, the explicit delegation of authority to the courts suggests the expectation that the customary judicial armamentorium
will be employed, including reliance on a variety of interpretive
methods and on all usual sources, including the state constitution.
Such an inference seems at least as compelling as the contrary, that
the legislature intended the judiciary to ignore the usual sources of
law. That this contrary view would lead to divergent interpretations
of the election code in different settings presents an additional reason to doubt such a legislative intent. The Florida Legislature enacted one set of laws that generally apply to presidential and
nonpresidential elections. The concurrence’s theory, however, would
bifurcate the interpretation of the election laws between presidential
elections and all other elections, which do not implicate Article II.
One might doubt that the Florida Legislature intended such a result.

117. See id. at 211, 213-36 (contrasting interpretive approaches based on legislative intent and on textual meaning); Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
1085, 1091 (1995) (“In contrast to textualism, intentionalism contends that the interpreter
should be the faithful agent of the intentions of the enacting legislature.”).
118. In response to Justice Scalia’s questions, Professor Tribe suggested a possible
divergence between the language of the statute and the intent of the legislature:
Well, I suppose if [the state legislators] were at all far-sighted, if they looked
at their own work and saw how self-contradictory it was, they might say we
would want someone with the authority to reconcile these provisions to do so in
the light not only of the literal language but of the fact that they are dealing
with something very important, the franchise, that disenfranchising people,
which is what this is all about, disenfranchising people isn’t very nice.
Oral Argument at 67-68, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000)
(No. 00-836), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/florida.html.
119. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 116, at 229.
120. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 636-46 (1995) (discussing textualism as a
“disciplinarian” approach to statutory construction).
121. One might note further that textualists often exhibit a skepticism about the legislative process and legislative judgments. See id. at 645; Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T:
Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1264 (2000)
(“[N]ew textualism embodies a skepticism of legislative judgments . . . .”). Though such
views are not logically inconsistent with a conclusion that Article II vests plenary power in
the state legislature, such skepticism about the political process might make one less inclined to infer plenary authority in the absence of a clear constitutional mandate.
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2. Contingency and Context
The proper interpretive approach depends in part on the relationship among the constitution, the courts, and the legislature, and a
variety of views of this relationship appear at least plausible. A more
robust account would require an analysis of the constitutional structure, constitutional history, and constitutional culture of a particular
state. The answer to the question of the proper interpretive method
does not lie in a hypothesized common law of constitutions but in the
thick background of each state’s constitution. Such questions of state
constitutional theory are contingent and contextual. They cannot be
resolved in the abstract. In this regard, one might question Justice
Scalia’s proffer of his experience with “the legislative branch.”122 His
universalizing observations, perceptive though they may be, shed little light on the constitutional context in which the country’s fifty legislative branches function.123 More generally, a recognition of this variety and contingency casts doubt on the wisdom of assigning the interpretive task to the United States Supreme Court. Unlike the state
supreme courts, the United States Supreme Court has little experience or expertise with such potentially intricate questions of state
law. It is important to note that what renders the question so intricate is the concurrence’s hypothesis of plenary legislative power. To
what extent the legislature would have wanted the court to take account of the state constitution, given the hypothesis of a nonbinding
constitution, is quite a complex inquiry. A generalized view of state
constitutions will do little to resolve this issue, and indeed the hypothetical and abstract quality of the query constitutes an argument
against the theory that would produce it.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Having argued that the concurrence’s flawed conception of state constitutional systems undermined its interpretation of Article II, I now
turn to some of the broader ramifications of the concurrence’s views.
Cases concerning presidential elections do not arise very frequently, but
the theory of state constitutions embodied in the concurrence could have
more widespread implications. Federal courts face state constitutional
issues in a variety of contexts. The interpretation of the state constitution, itself, may raise a federal claim, or a federal court might have supplemental jurisdiction over a state constitutional claim. The conception

122. Oral Argument at 66, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70
(2000) (No. 00-836), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/florida.html.
123. For a related argument that state separation of powers principles should be developed in light of the varying contexts of the various state systems, see Robert A.
Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 99-108 (1998).
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of state constitutionalism implicit in the Bush II concurrence suggests
interpretive principles that would apply in these areas.
The concurrence adopted a uniform view of state constitutions. The
concurrence showed no interest in examining specific state constitutions or constitutional systems. The concurrence seemed to assume
that all state constitutional systems function in a roughly similar
manner. The concurrence also evidenced a distrust of state judges.
This combination of a skepticism about the state judiciary and a
homogenous view of state constitutions does not bode well for the New
Judicial Federalism. This development involves state courts interpreting their constitutions independently of the Federal Constitution, often with the effect of extending constitutional protections beyond those
mandated by the federal charter.124 Under the conception of the Bush
II concurrence, state constitutional decisions deviating from the federal norm might elicit suspicion. The assumption of general uniformity
of constitutional systems might raise a concern that a court’s decision
to depart from the federal standard reflects unprincipled activism, and
the Court’s apparent skepticism about the state judiciary also might
trigger a more searching review of state constitutional decisions.
As far as the concurrence is concerned, the villain of the piece is
the Florida Supreme Court, representing judicial activism. Justice
Scalia’s questioning implied that the very reliance on the state constitution signaled a kind of activism and that the business of state
constitutions is to distort the will of the legislature. Such views
might influence the Justices to cast a sympathetic eye on the argument that the state court interpretation of the state constitution actually violated federal law.
Similarly, the assumptions underlying the concurrence imply that
the federal courts might take a narrow view of state constitutional
interpretation that arises in the context of supplemental jurisdiction.
The concurrence’s approach suggests that a federal court would be
reluctant to credit a claim that the state constitution protects rights
in addition to those enshrined in the Federal Constitution. Inclined
to impose a uniform vision on state constitutions, the concurrence’s
view raises the possibility that any federal baseline that did exist
would be treated as a presumptive norm. Within this framework,
chastened by the view of state judges as activists, the federal courts
would be less likely to acknowledge additional protections conferred
by the state charter. In certain areas, federal courts currently play

124. For an overview of the New Judicial Federalism, see G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 1112-13 (1997) (discussing
growth of “new judicial federalism”); see also Jennifer Friesen, Adventures in Federalism:
Some Observations on the Overlapping Spheres of State and Federal Constitutional Law, 3
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 25 (1993) (same).
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an active role in the development of state constitutional law, particularly in the context of cases raising constitutional claims under both
the state and federal constitutions.125 Under the concurrence’s approach, federal courts might be less willing to engage in this kind of
distinctive state constitutional interpretation. At least in supplemental jurisdiction cases, the federal floor may turn into a ceiling. Relatively novel claims in particular might suffer under this analysis.
A proper role in the interpretation of state constitutions would require federal courts to attend to the particular constitutional circumstances in each state. Federal courts are certainly able to perform
such tasks. My point has been that the concurrence showed no willingness to undertake such an interpretive exercise in Bush II. The
different institutional circumstances of the federal courts might
make them valuable partners in providing a different perspective on
state constitutional issues. In the supplemental jurisdiction context,
however, unlike in the presidential election cases, the federal courts
would remain bound by authoritative state court determinations of
state law. Federal courts could participate in the interpretive process, but they would not have the last word.
Certainly, even if the concurrence in Bush II had garnered majority
support, it would not provide an authoritative guide for a particular
reading of state constitutions in other contexts. Nevertheless, the concurrence evidenced a particular attitude to state constitutions and
state courts that may apply more generally. Further, the presidential
election cases may help to shape the approach of those Justices who
had not devoted much attention to state constitutions and their role in
state legal systems. For the five Justices who joined the majority opinion in Bush II, the image of state constitutions and state courts may be
tarred by the Justices’ perceptions of the impropriety of the Florida
Supreme Court’s actions. When state constitutional issues present
themselves, these Justices might be more inclined to “rein in” activist
interpretations that deviate from the standards in other states and
from the federal standard. Such an attitude to state constitutionalism
would be an unfortunate reaction to the presidential election dispute,
and it would, as I have suggested, ignore important features of state
constitutionalism. In this regard, one might hope that the Supreme
Court’s treatment of state constitutions in the Bush cases was anomalous. In this area, it would be desirable if the Court followed the proviso that it attached to its equal protection ruling: “Our consideration
is limited to the present circumstances . . . .”126

125. For a discussion of the role that federal courts currently play in the interpretation
of state constitutions, see Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions
in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409 (1999).
126. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam).

